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RESPONSE TO HICK 
William P. Alston 
This is a response to Hick's comments on my approach to the problem of 
religious diversity in Perceiving God. Before unearthing the bones I have to 
pick with him, let me fully acknowledge that I have not provided a fully 
satisfactory solution to the problem. At most I have done the best that can 
be done given the constraints within which I was working. But this best, if 
such it be, is not as bad as Hick makes it appear. To show this I need to 
make several corrections in Hick's depiction of the situation. 
Hick says that on (my) assumption that at most one of the major world 
religious systems is true, "religious experience generally produces false 
beliefs", and hence is not a reliable source of belief. But this is too fast in 
more than one way. First, it assumes that most of the beliefs in each sys-
tem contradict most of the beliefs in the others. But that is by no means 
clear, and in the absence of any definite way of counting beliefs it could 
not be clear. Indeed, my impression is that it is false. Second, Hick 
unduly inflates the role of religious experience in grounding religious 
beliefs. Though I argue at length in Perceiving God that it is one impor-
tant ground of religious belief, I devote the last chapter to discussing the 
ways in which it interacts with other grounds - natural theology, revela-
tion, etc. - each of which makes its own distinctive contribution. Thus, 
even if the major religious belief systems are mostly in contradiction, 
there is still the question of the extent to which this is to be laid at the 
door of religious experience. It could be that the differences are much 
more due to the other grounds and that, insofar as beliefs are based 
wholly or largely on religious experience, there is much less contradic-
tion between the different religions. 
But even if most beliefs based on religious experience were false, that 
would not contradict the epistemological claims (at least the most basic 
epistemological claim) I make for religious experience in the book. For 
that basic claim is that its seeming to one that some Ultimate Reality 
(UR) is presenting itself to one's experience as 0 makes it prima facie justi-
fied that UR is o. And this prima facie justification can be overriden by 
various contrary factors, including sufficient reasons for supposing that 
UR is not o. Such an overrider might take the form of a predominance 
of (perhaps more strongly) justified beliefs that contradict the supposi-
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tion that DR is 0. So even on my "worst case scenario", on which there 
are no sufficient reasons independent of religious experience to prefer 
one world religion to others, religious experience can still render the 
beliefs based on it prima facie justified, even if much or most of this justi-
fication is overriden. 
One final note. Though I did not in the book try to show that there 
are extra-experiential reasons for preferring the Christian beliefs-system 
to its rivals, and though I have no intention of embarking on that here, I 
am not prepared to admit that it is "a hope rather than a reality". It is, 
indeed a hope, but one that, I believe, can be given some substance. 
Syracuse University 
